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The 1981-82 Seventh Circuit intellectual property cases were
somewhat routine and without departure from established precedent.
However, quite a few of them treated unusual subjects. One case in-
volved both an interference proceeding and a method patent which
made use of microorganisms. On the procedural side of patent litiga-
tion, the court reviewed one of the first suits to take advantage of the
new reissue proceeding and found the proceeding there to have been
tainted. One case carefully considered the protection and infringement
of copyrighted video games. Another involved the antitrust aspects of
blanket copyright licenses. There were no major decisions in the area
of unfair competition and trademark law.
PATENTS
Irregularities in Reissue Proceeding Diminishes Presumption of Validity
of Patent
Mooney v. Brunswick Corp.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court's analysis of a reissue
proceeding in Mooney v. Brunswick Corp. ' and agreed that defects in
the proceeding diminished any presumption of validity that would at-
tach in the consideration of prior art revealed under the reissue pro-
ceeding. The litigation focused on a structure patent 2 and a method
patent3 regarding a ratchet clutch and bevel gear assembly. The plain-
tiff had brought suit on a single claim of each patent. The defendant
denied infringement and challenged the validity of both patents. After
an eight day bench trial, the court concluded that the claim of the struc-
ture patent was obvious to one skilled in the art, and therefore invalid
under section 1034 of title 35 of the United States Code. The court
* Associate, Robert D. Kolar & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.E., Manhattan Col-
lege; J.D., IIT/Chicago Kent College of Law.
I. 663 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1981).
2. U.S. Patent No. 3,245,280.
3. U.S. Patent No. 3,248,782.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1981) provides:
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decided that the defendant's method of producing its own ratchet
clutch and bevel gear was sufficiently different to preclude infringe-
ment. The plaintiff appealed, seeking review of the district court's rul-
ings of invalidity and noninfringement.
The plaintiff argued that the district court had failed to give proper
weight to the presumption of validity accorded to the structure patent
which had received the approval of the Patent Office through a reissue
proceeding.5  The plaintiff had filed the reissue proceeding to
strengthen his position in the litigation and cited fifty-one patents and
five general items as prior art for the examiner's consideration. Each of
these had been uncovered during discovery. A notice of the plaintiff's
reissue application was published in the Official Gazette and opposi-
tion statements were submitted by the defendant and a third party.
The Patent Office denied the reissue application in that it found
that the claims of the original were allowable over the prior art. The
trial and appellate courts found several serious irregularities in the reis-
sue proceedings.
Although opposition statements were filed with the Patent Office,
and testimony at trial revealed that the examiner had the statements in
his possession, the opposition statements were never entered in the rec-
ord and acknowledged by the Patent Office. The courts concluded that
the opposition statements were not considered, or, alternatively, not
considered relevant by the examiner.6 The courts found that the state-
ments were not accorded their proper weight and that the irregularity
diminished the effect of the reissue refusal.
The courts also concluded that the examiner failed to consider two
of the most relevant pieces of prior art, despite the fact that they were
disclosed in the reissue application. The fifty-six references submitted
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
5. Reissue proceedings were originally designed to enable a patent holder to remedy inad-
vertent mistakes.in patent drawings and specifications. Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut
Co., 310 U.S. 281 (1940). The procedure was amended in March of 1977, however, to permit
patent owners to obtain a ruling from the Patent Office on the pertinence of additional prior art
which was not cited in the original patent application. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1982). If the
Patent Office determines that the patent is not defective or invalid in light of the additional prior
art, the reissue application is rejected. If, however, the patent is defective, the reissue application
is allowed and the owner of the patent must surrender it to the Patent Office in return for a
corrected Reissue Patent. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1981); Moonev, 663 F.2d at 730.
6. Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 489 F. Supp. 544, 555 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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with the application, in which the two pieces of prior art were included,
were not arranged in any order of importance. Neither of the two
pieces of prior art were included on the examiner's list, although a large
number of others were included. Thus, the courts concluded that the
examiner failed to consider the two pieces of prior art as important
prior art. The district court and the court of appeals both considered
the two pieces of prior art to be important prior art. As a result, the
statutory presumption of validity, which may be enhanced when prior
art has been considered and rejected by the Patent Office, was dissi-
pated in this case regarding the two pieces of art.7
Finally, an attorney for the plaintiff had conducted interviews with
the examiner before the first Office Action on the reissue application, in
violation of Patent Office rules. 8 The district court found that some,
but not most, of the material discussed involved patentability. The ap-
pellate court indicated that the interviews might have been, to a consid-
erable degree, innocent in purpose, but believed that the proceeding
may have been tainted by the interviews. Again, the effect was to di-
minish any presumption of validity which would have resulted from
the reissue procedure.
Even in the absence of a fortified presumption of validity, the Sev-
enth Circuit reviewed the district court's determination of obviousness
under Graham v. John Deere Co. 9. As required, the court examined
(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between
the prior art and the claim at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art.
The appellate court upheld the finding of obviousness by the trial
court. But the court's analysis of the level of ordinary skill in the perti-
nent art is of special interest. The district court reviewed the statements
7. Reissue proceedings do not necessarily strengthen the presumption of validity of a patent
in every case. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 62 (7th Cir.
1980).
8. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133 (1982).
9. 383 U.S. 1 (1965). In Graham, the Supreme Court stated:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, ... the § 103 condi-
tion, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to
several basic factual inquires. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to
be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this back-
ground, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquires may have relevancy.
Id. at 17-18 (citations omitted).
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and qualifications of the experts who testified for both parties at the
trial and concluded that:
[T]he level of skill in the art of gear design was very high in 1962.
Those of ordinary skill in the art would at least have had a degree in
Mechanical Engineering. In addition, it is clear that .. . those
skilled in the art of gear design would also be skilled in the art of
milling or metal cutting. Furthermore, one skilled in the art would
also be expected to have a good deal of practical experience. . . and
would probably hold a number of patents which originated from
their work.' 0
Such a finding of fact, which was approved by the Seventh Circuit,
is itself unremarkable. However, the district court had set out the
plaintiff's credentials in some detail. They were identical to the court's
description of one skilled in the art."I While neither court announced
reasoning to the effect that an "invention" produced by one having
only the credentials of one skilled in the art is presumed to be obvious,
the inference cannot be avoided. The appellate court upheld the find-
ing of non-infringement of the method patent.
Claims Interpreted More Broadly Than Preferred Embodiment
Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co.
In Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co. ,12 the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's ruling of patent validity and infringe-
ment but reversed as to an award of treble damages and attorney's fees.
The invention involved a corn picking machine commonly at-
tached to a combine for use in harvesting the grain. Specifically, the
invention had to do with the mounting of the units on a support struc-
ture and the provision of mechanical power to the units.
The argument presented by International Harvester (IH) regard-
ing non-infringement went to the construction of the claims. The basis
of their argument was that a limitation of the preferred embodiment
should be read into the claims. The embodiment showed a single, uni-
tary drive shaft and a gear housing which was capable of being reposi-
tioned along the shaft without adjustment of the shaft. On Harvester's
device, the position of the gear housings could be adjusted, but the
shaft had to be segmented and rejoined during adjustment. The claims
in question, though, only required that a "'main rotatable horizontal
drive shaft'" be present in addition to the requirement "that the gear
10. Mooney, 489 F. Supp. at 560.
11. Id. at 558.
12. 658 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981).
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housing be attached to the beam so that it is moveable."' 3
The district court resolved the question of infringement by scruti-
nizing IH's harvester to see if it contained both elements. It also had to
determine if a single, unitary piece was required by the claims. The
answer was that in the IH device, the gear housing is moveable and
there is only one drive shaft. There was no limitation in the claim re-
quiring moveability to be accomplished without the additional parts
which were involved in the segmentation and rejoining of the IH unit.
Hence, infringement was found. The appellate court agreed with the
district court and commented:
It is ironic that IH urges us to note that the claims do not say
that the drive shaft may be modified to permit adjustment when the
same principle proves their argument false. The claims also do not
say that the drive shaft may not be modified to permit adjustment,
but is required to be one piece. The claims are not limited to either
configuration and this is precisely the point. 14
IH also sought the limitation of "self-contained adjustability" to
be read into the claims. That term did not appear in the patent specifi-
cations, but was asserted by IH to be the thrust of the invention. IH's
assertion was supposedly supported by language contained in a letter
from the Patent Office. The letter characterized all the patent claims as
"drawn to a plural unit corn harvesting device, wherein the spacing
between units may be varied, while maintaining the drive there-
for. . . ." But the appellate court found no need to speculate whether
the Patent Office wished to limit all the claims to the language of the
letter. Since the Patent Office did not do so in the prosecution of the
application, the court did not accept IH's interpretation that the letter
mandated that all the claims be so limited.
IH further asked that the claims be limited in light of descriptions
of the device which Deere had made during prosecution of a foreign
patent application on the device. The district court, relying on Ellipse
Corp. v. Ford Motor Co. ,15 refused to admit such evidence since the
statements postdated the issuance of the patent. The appellate court
agreed that Ellpse did preclude reliance on subsequent events in inter-
preting patent claims. But the court further noted that Ellpse added
that "[a] patentee's interpretation under a patent may never be used to
add to a patent something which was not there at the time of issu-
13. Id. at 1139-40.
14. Id. at 1140-41.
15. 452 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972).
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ance." 6 The court applied the case by analogy, and rejected IH's at-
tempt to use the language of the documents of the subsequent
prosecution to add to the claims something which was not there.
The Seventh Circuit did indicate exactly what might not be added
to the claims. While a patentee may not be allowed to suggest a broad-
ening of the claim to encompass an infringement, and an infringer may
not suggest a narrowing of the claims to escape infringement, not all
possibilities are covered. May a patentee introduce evidence that a
claim is narrower than it appears on its face, in order to escape a charge
of double patenting? May a licensee introduce evidence that a claim is
broader than it appears on its face, in order to show that the device he
produces is indeed included under a claim he is licensed to use? The
court seemingly rejects the use of any subsequent interpretations to add
to or subtract from the claim, whether by broadening or narrowing of
the claim and whether it is being used as a sword or a shield.
The award of treble damages was reversed since the findings of the
district court did not amount to a showing of bad faith. An award of
increased damages is within the discretion of the trial judge and may
only be reversed where there is an abuse of discretion. 17 But here the
standards had not been met. The award of attorney's fees was also
reversed since no bad faith conduct had been shown.
Doctrine of Equivalents
Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.
A review of a ruling by the district court of infringement was the
subject of Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp. 18
The district court had found the plaintiff's patent valid and that the
defendant had infringed numerous claims of the patent despite the fact
that an attempt had been made to avoid infringement. Treble damages
had been awarded for wilful infringement.
The appellate court affirmed and adopted the lower court's opin-
ion. The lower court's conclusions of law and fact had been adapted,
with minor modification, from those submitted by the plaintiff.
The invention, a "Web-Winding Apparatus and Method"' 9 is em-
ployed to form small rolls of material such as toilet tissue and paper
16. Deere, 658 F.2d at 1142 quoting Ellipse Corp., 452 F.2d at 169 (emphasis added).
17. Deere, 658 F.2d at 1147. See also Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
18. 680 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1982), afl'g 211 U.S.P.Q. 788 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
19. U.S. Patent Reissue No. 28,353 based on original U.S. Patent 3,179,348.
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toweling. The paper is unwound at high speeds and rewound onto
cardboard cores which are held on rotating mandrels. After one man-
drel is wound with paper, a second blank mandrel is moved into posi-
tion. An automated knife emerges and cuts the web of paper and an
automated pusher directs the leading edge of the web against the glue
on the new cardboard core. As the rate of speed of transfer was in-
creased, difficulties were encountered in the operation of the knife and
pusher and reliable operation was limited to speeds of 1000 feet per
minute.
The plaintiff's invention overcame the difficulties encountered by
utilizing a bedroll and a pin means which were extensibly mounted on
the roller. A pusher means was also extensibly mounted on the roller
to urge the web portion against an adjacent mandrel.20
The trial court did consider the validity of the patent according to
the requirements of Deere2' and found it valid after a somewhat cur-
sory analysis. The question of infringement, and to some extent, valid-
ity, was more the result of the behavior of the defendant, which the
court must have found nefarious.
The accused machine was the result of a proposal to the Scott Pa-
per Company. This was after the invention had achieved widespread
success with over 500 machines embodying the invention being sold in
a field with a limited number of customers. The defendant had never
built a rewinder before, but four of five employees of the designer were
former employees of the plaintiff. The salient difference between the
machines was that the moveable element for cutting on the infringing
machine was placed on a cooperating cutoff roll, rather than on the
bedroll.
The defendant admitted that all of the machanical elements of the
claim were present in its machine except that the pin means was not
extensibly mounted. However, the defendant also argued that the pur-
pose of the accused machine was to wind under high tension rather
than high speed. This was supposed to be made possible by the differ-
ent arrangement of the cutting and transfer mechanism. 22 However,
the court found no evidence to support the defendant's contention.
Rather, it found that the arrangement was devised by the defendant in
20. Id. Column 12, lines 31-41.
21. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
22. Paper Converting Mach. Corp. v. Magna Graphics Corp., 211 U.S.P.Q. 788, 791 (E.D.
Wis. 1981).
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an attempt to avoid the plaintiff's patent while the function and design
were the substantial equivalent.
The finding of equivalence was supported by the testimony of
Scott's finishing engineer who stated that it made no difference whether
the knife was mounted on one roll or the other and whether the pins
came out to impale the web or the web was pushed onto the pins. The
court applied the doctrine of equivalents as stated in Graver Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Linde Co. 23 and 35 U.S.C. section 11224.
The court also considered that the defendant sold their machine
without advice of counsel as to whether there might be infringement.
The court concluded that infringement was deliberate.
The finding of validity of the patent, at least in the eyes of the
court, was influenced by the defendant's behavior in that their machine
was found to be an imitation of the patented device. Under Anderson
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 25 the court found that this was conclusive
of what the defendant thinks of the patent and persuasive of what the
rest of the world ought to think.
Loss of Interference Proceeding and Later Defense to Infringement of
Obviousness
Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
The case of Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. ,26
concerned an appeal from the trial court's finding of validity and in-
fringement of the patent. The plaintiff and defendant had become in-
volved in an interference declared by the Patent Office over an
invention related to enzyme-producing bacteria. The Board of Inter-
ferences awarded priority to the application submitted by the plaintiff,
Novo Industri A/S (Novo). The United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals affirmed the decision 27 and the United States Supreme
23. 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950).
24. The district court stated:
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, an element in a claim for a combination patent may be
expressed "as a means or step for performing a specified function"-in this case, the
impalement and transfer of the leading edge to the new core-"and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifi-
cation and the equivalents thereof."
211 U.S.P.Q. at 791.
25. 165 F. Supp. 611, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1958), modified on other grounds, 265 F.2d 755 (7th Cir.
1959). See also Copease Mfg. Co. v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 298 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.
1961); Ric-Wil Co. v. E.B. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 958
(1950); Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1949).
26. 677 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1982).
27. Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The issue on appeal was whether
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Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari submitted by Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. (Travenol). Despite this, Travenol continued to
market its product and the plaintiff brought suit for infringement.
On appeal, Travenol presented what the appellate court found to
be an anomolous position. The Court commented that earlier, Trave-
nol had believed the discovery to be so revoluntionary as to warrant an
application for a patent, and believed that extended litigation for those
patent rights was warranted. Yet, after being accused of infringing the
patent, Travenol defended its later actions, i.e. continued practice of
the invention, by asserting the obviousness of the discovery.
The theory of obviousness, vel non, revolved around one patent in
the prior art and the history of research and nomenclature regarding
certain microorganisms. While the trial and appellate courts rejected
Travenol's various theories on their face, they added that the finding of
non-obviousness was buttressed by Travenol's efforts to claim domestic
and foreign patent protection for the same discovery. 28
Another issue on appeal was Travenol's contention that Novo's
patent violated the "best mode" requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 112,
which requires both that the patent disclose an invention in a manner
that will enable a worker skilled in the art to reproduce the invention
(enablement) and that the patent disclose the best method of using the
invention known to the patentee at the time of the patent application
(best mode). 29 Travenol also argued that the district court erred in con-
sidering "best mode" and "enablement" as indistinguishable from each
other in this case.
Novo's United States patent application had failed to disclose a
recovery step which had been disclosed in its British patent application
on the same subject matter. The inventor had used two different
defoaming agents in his work, but only one defoaming agent was dis-
Aunstrup had complied with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 by depositing cultures of the
microorganism in a foreign depository. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found that it
did meet the requirements of the statute since it assured public access to an essential starting
material (the microorganism) in the recited process. Feldman, 517 F.2d at 1356.
28. Novo IndustriA/S, 677 F.2d at 1209, citing McKee Door Co. v. Forest Door Co., 284
F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1960). See also LaSalle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 445
F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971); University of Illinois Found. v. Block Drug Co., 241 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.
1957).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) provides in part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
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closed in the application. The district court found that the recovery
step was well known to workers skilled in the art and that the use of the
undisclosed defoaming agent, or any defoaming agent, was not neces-
sary to produce the results taught by the patent.
The applicant had not omitted anything from the application in
issue that would prevent anyone with ordinary skill in the art from
enjoying the benefit of the invention. The Seventh Circuit did not dis-
cuss the basic mode requirement. However, they found that the district
court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the court had col-
lapsed the best mode and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. sec-
tion 112 into a single inquiry. In the circumstances of the case, the two
requirements merge with each other.30
The court explained that the patent did not claim to disclose a new
process for producing the enzyme; rather, it identified a specific organ-
ism as an agent which produces significantly greater amounts of the
enzyme than previously known agents. This was by way of a process
that the district court found was already familiar to ordinary workers
skilled in the art. The organism does all the work that makes the dis-
covery patentable and the patent application requires only that the pat-
ent applicant provide samples and enough taxonomic information so
that an ordinary worker skilled in the art could order the organism
from a culture collection. Hence, the identification of the organism si-
multaneously provided both an enabling and best mode disclosure. 3'
The trial court's awards of increased damages and attorney's fees were
approved, based on an unambiguous showing of misconduct. 32
Some conduct of the defendant was cited in support of such a
harsh conclusion. Travenol had paid for a hold harmless agreement
from the buyer when it sold the Travenol division responsible for the
infringement. It had also sought legal advice regarding the interference
and infringement actions, including advice regarding increased dam-
ages and legal fees as part of a presumably anticipated judgment
against them. The advice had been sought on an oral basis from four
patent law firms. However, Travenol did not introduce any evidence
that it had obtained a legal opinion justifying its sale of the infringing
product. Further, the trial judge found that once the interference pro-
ceeding had been concluded and the patent had been issued to Novo,
30. Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Laboratories, 677 F.2d at 1210.
31. Id.
32. 677 F.2d at 1211. See also Airtex Corp. v. Shelly Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1976), 35 U.S.C. § 284 (damages for infringement).
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Travenol was under an affirmative duty to determine whether it had a
legal basis for the continued sale of the product.
Finally, the court was unusually critical of Travenol's conduct of
the trial, stating that their defenses were not asserted in good faith. The
defenses were said to be an afterthought to dazzle the district judge and
take advantage of his lack of familiarity with the state of the art of
technical areas involved. The Seventh Circuit relied on what it saw
underlying Travenol's argument-mischaracterization of the evidence
and the deliberate avoidance of knowledge that might be disadvanta-
geous to its position.
No Presumption of Examiner's Knowledge
Medical Laboratory Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc.
In Medical Laboratory Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc. ,33 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that it could not assume that an examiner had consid-
ered a structure as prior art, even though the same examiner had
addressed the application on that structure. Medical Laboratory Auto-
mation, Inc. (MLA), the owner of a patent for a stackable tray to hold
pipette tips, brought an action for infringement against Labcon, Inc.
and Ways And Means, Inc. (Labcon). Before trial, the defendants
moved for summary judgment on several grounds. On the recommen-
dation of the magistrate hearing the case, the district court granted the
defendants' motion and held that the patent was invalid.
On appeal, MLA contended that it was improper for the district
court to grant the motion for summary judgment since factual disputes
were present.34 Specifically in issue was whether the Patent Office had
or had not considered the most relevant prior art. The question of fact
was whether the examiner considered the "Cohen" structure as prior
art, notwithstanding that it was not referenced in the file wrapper. This
would be relevant to the existence or weight accorded to the presump-
tion of validity of the patent. The court explained the circumstances as
well as its own conclusion:
MLA notes that the Cohen application was pending at the time the
[present] application was considered, and also claims that the same
Examiner addressed both applications. From this, and Patent Office
procedures, MLA argues that the Examiner must necessarily have
considered the effect of the Cohen structure on the [present one] and
decided it did not defeat the application. MLA explains the absence
33. 670 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1981).
34. See generally Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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of any reference to Cohen as either an unnecessary equivalent cita-
tion or as an attempt to preserve the confidentiality of the pending
Cohen application.
This court's decisions are clear that we may not safely assume
that the Examiner considered an example of prior art if it is not cited.
We can only presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
it was overlooked.35
The issue of whether the examiner actually considered the Cohen pat-
ent application was not critical on appeal, since, after considering the
prior art including Cohen, the Seventh Circuit upheld the lower court's
finding of obviousness.
District Court Upheld in Frivolous Case
Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc.
The granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the
defendant was approved in Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc. 36, a case
which the district court had branded as frivolous. Schutt manufactured
face masks to protect football players and straps to secure the masks to
helmets. Schutt owned the United States Trademark registration on
the term "Full Cage" used in connection with the mask and a United
States Patent37 on a resilient means to attach a mask to a helmet. Rid-
dell, Inc. (Riddell) purchased masks from Schutt but later dropped
Schutt as a supplier. Riddell then issued a dealer news letter and ad-
vertisement stating that it was introducing a new line of masks. Pre-
sumably, Riddell continued to use the term "Full Cage" and use a
strap system similar to the one patented by Schutt. After some discus-
sion between the parties, Riddell agreed to cease using Schutt's trade-
mark and style and size designations but later petitioned the Patent and
Trademark Office to cancel Schutt's Full Cage trademark.
Subsequently, Schutt filed suit alleging patent infringement, trade-
mark infringement, unfair competition, and violation of consumer
product warranty laws. At the close of discovery, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, noting that
"[s]eldom have we seen a lawsuit as unwarranted and frivolous as this
one."
3 8
On appeal, Schutt maintained that the district court erred in find-
35. 670 F.2d at 673, citing Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1091 (1976); Milton Mfg. Co. v. Potter-Weil Corp., 327 F.2d
437 (7th Cir. 1964).
36. 673 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1982).
37. U.S. Patent No. 3,263,236.
38. 673 F.2d at 204.
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ing the mounting device obvious, since there was no evidence as to the
level of skill in the art and thus, an unresolved issue of material fact
remained. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the case in accordance with
Deere to ascertain whether the presence of the disputed issue of ma-
terial fact rendered the judgment improper. However, the court re-
jected the necessity for evidence establishing the level of one skilled in
the art:
As this court recently reiterated . . . if the differences between
the patent in issue and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole is obvious to a lay [person], a determination of the level of
skill on the basis of expert testimony in the pertinent art would be
useless.39 . . . As our discussion above makes clear, the patent in
suit is not markedly different from the prior art, and the concept of
tying the mask to the helmet with a flexible strap is not one of such
complexity that expert testimony is compelled. When the level of
skill is obvious to a layperson, that issue is not materially in
dispute. 40
The appellate court therefore found that the trial court had not
erred in granting summary judgment without the benefit of evidence of
the level of ordinary skill. The Seventh Circuit also affirmed that the
district court had properly acted within its discretion in refusing injunc-
tive relief. The district court had ruled that because Riddell clearly did
not threaten to persist in or resume the alleged trademark infringement
or unfair conduct, equitable relief would be inappropriate. The appel-
late court commented that it was within the discretion of the trial court
to grant or deny an injunction against conduct which had ceased and is
not likely to recur.4'
Summary judgment on the issue of damages for trademark in-
fringement was also approved. The defendant's motion for summary
judgment asserted that no actual consumer reliance on its use of the
plaintiff's designations had occurred and that the plaintiff had not pro-
vided evidence of customer confusion in response to specific interroga-
tories directed to that issue. Further, the plaintiff had not submitted
affidavits or other matter demonstrating the existence of any issue of
material fact as to such confusion. Hence, judgment for the defendant
39. 673 F.2d at 205, quoting Medical Laboratory Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d
671, 674 (7th Cir. 1981).
40. Id.
41. 673 F.2d at 207. See also Scotch Whisky Association v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d
809, 813 (7th Cir. 1973); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cit.
1958); John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292, 326 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Field Enter.
Educ. Corp. v. Cove Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 989, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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was proper.4 2
Finding of Invalidity on Summary Judgment Not Limited to Claims
Listed in Infringement Count
Harvestall Industries, Inc. v. Hochstetler
In Harvestall Industries, Inc. v. Hochstetler,4 3 the Seventh Circuit
reviewed the district court's ruling on the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and agreed that it properly held the entire patent inva-
lid, even though the defendants had brought the motion regarding only
the two claims listed in the complaint. The focus of the controversy
was a patent" for a base and support of grain storage bins. The com-
plaint alleged one count for infringement of claims 5 and 7, another of
trademark infringement and a third of unfair competition. The de-
fendant denied the charges and filed a three part counterclaim which
alleged: (1) that the entire patent was invalid and unenforceable;
(2) Sherman Act violations; and (3) fraud on the Patent Office in con-
nection with the trademark registration.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and the
court held that the patent was invalid. In doing so, it adopted virtually
all of the defendants' findings of fact and most of the proposed conclu-
sions of law. It eventually also denied a motion by the plaintiffs to
amend the judgment to invalidate only claims 5 and 7 rather than the
entire patent.
It should be noted that the counterclaim, which could be charac-
terized as a declaratory judgment action regarding every claim of the
patent, was not in issue in the defendants' motion. The motion stated,
in pertinent part, "Defendant [sic] is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, that the claims of the patent in suit alleged to be infringed are inva-
lid . . . and that the accused devices do not infringe the patent in
suit."' 45 Further, the district court's order stated that "it is clear from
the prior art of record thai the invention as defined by claims 5 and 7
would have been obvious to a person with such a level of skill at the
time of invention." 46
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit approved the broad holding of in-
42. See Zirin Laboratories International, Inc. v. Mead-Johnson & Co., 208 F. Supp. 633, 635
(E.D. Mich. 1962).
43. 656 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1981).
44. U.S. Patent 3,426,445.
45. 656 F.2d at 1234 n.4 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 1235.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
validity for two reasons. First, they found that although the complaint
alleged only that claims 5 and 7 were infringed, the plaintiffs had
brought the other independent claims into dispute as well. In plaintiffs'
brief in opposition to the summary judgment motion, they argued, "[iut
should be noted at the outset, for example, that whereas Defendants
contend that only Claims 5 and 7 are in issue, that is not the case."
Secondly, the appellate court noted that there was nothing to distin-
guish claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 in substance from claims 5 and 7.47 In con-
clusion, it stated that while the language of the summary judgment
motion could have been clearer, it did call into question the validity of
the entire patent, and that the district court correctly found it invalid in
its entirety.
New Evidence Excluded in Appeal From Board of Patent Interferences
Piher, S.A. v. CTS Corp.
Piher, S.A. v. CTS Corp. 48 was an appeal from a district court rul-
ing which affirmed a ruling by the Board of Patent Interferences that
CTS Corporation (CTS) had reduced an invention to practice before
Piher, S.A. (Piher) had. Any party to an interference dissatisfied with
the decision of the Board on questions of priority may have a remedy
by civil action.49 Such a proceeding is a hybrid action combining ele-
ments of a de novo trial and appellate review; the right to offer new
evidence is limited.50 The Seventh Circuit upheld the lower courts ex-
clusion of new evidence under the circumstances.
The district court had refused to hear evidence in addition to the
record before the Board. Piher had attempted to call three witnesses:
the former patent counsel of CTS; an independent patent counsel; and
an expert. The CTS counsel would be examined in an attempt to show
inexcusable delay in his filing of the patent application rather than, as
CTS claimed, that an extended period of time was needed for prepara-
tion. The independent patent counsel would testify that the delay was
inexcusable. The expert would testify that the invention had not been
reduced to practice.
On review, the Seventh Circuit held that Piher should bear the
burden of proving that it had not waived the right to present evidence.
47. Id. at 1236.
48. 664 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1981).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1982).
50. See Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 579 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1978).
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It also found that there was no error, in light of Piher's previous con-
duct, in denying admission of the evidence.
Earlier, at the hearing held before the district court, Piher had con-
ceded that the additional evidence was not necessary. The trial judge
had questioned Piher's counsel as to whether he thought the denial of
allowing the evidence was reversible error. Counsel repeatedly averred
that the new evidence was not essential. The issue of delay in filing the
application had been fully litigated before the Board and Piher had
taken advantage of the opportunity to introduce expert testimony to
refute CTS's position. An adverse decision after full opportunity to
present evidence was held not to be a special circumstance within the
scope of Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co. 5 which would give
the party an absolute right to present additional evidence.
On appeal, Piher also contended that the Board's award of priority
to CTS might be affirmed only if the decision was supported by clear
and convincing proof and that CTS should be held to the strictest of
proofs in view of the unreliability of the oral testimony of the inven-
tor.52 The Seventh Circuit, in upholding the decision of the district
court and Board, found that the inventor's testimony had been corrob-
orated by several witnesses and exhibits and that the decision of the
Patent Office must be affirmed unless the character and amount of evi-
dence carries a thorough conviction that a contrary result should
obtain.5 3
Piher also contended that CTS's twenty-eight month delay in filing
the application constituted unreasonable delay per se. Relying on a
1980 decision by the Board of Interferences, Klug v. Wood 54 , Piher con-
tended that, as a matter of law, a delay of twenty-six months or more
raises an inference of suppression or concealment of the invention, an
inference which had not been rebutted by CTS.
Reliance on the Klug case was somewhat tenuous in that the
Board hearing the present case had found that the delay by CTS was
only for a period of twenty-two months and that the delay was justified.
Further, in Kug, the Board had stated that Klug's delay constituted,
prima facie, an unreasonable delay, whereas Piher argued that the
Board had established a per se rule in all cases.
51. Id.
52. Cf. The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 284 (1892) (holding that when the existence
and use of an unpatented device are proven by oral testimony, proof of anticipation of a patent
must be beyond a reasonable doubt).
53. Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 477 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1973).
54. Patent Interference No. 99,716 (Board of Patent Interferences, Apr. 29, 1981).
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The circuit court did not read Kug so broadly. It stated that in
Klug, the Board noted that Shindelar v. Holdeman55 cautioned against
any attempt to establish a rule that a particular length of time consti-
tuted per se unreasonable delay. Hence the Board's finding that there
was no suppression or concealment was affirmed as well as the judg-
ment of the district court.
TRADEMARKS
During the 1981-1982 term there were no major decisions by the
Seventh Circuit involving the field of Trademarks.
COPYRIGHT
Blanket Copyright License Found to be Neither Copyright Misuse nor
a Violation of the Sherman Act
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago
In EEL. Publications, Ltd v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago ,56 the
Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the blanket
copyright license involved was a tying contract and a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. The appellate court also considered whether the li-
cense was illegal under the rule of reason, but also rejected that
possibility.
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. (F.E.L.) is a publisher which markets
songs to Chicago's Catholic parishes. It owns the copyrights to approx-
imately fourteen hundred songs. The license in question was termed,
by F.E.L., as an Annual Copy License ("ACL"). It allowed a given
parish to copy one or more of F.E.L.'s fourteen hundred titles, in un-
limited quantities for a period of one year. The license cost $100 per
year and required that copies be destroyed at year's end unless the li-
cense is renewed. The license permitted the individual parishes to cre-
ate custom-made hymnals. (Presumably, the hymnals would contain
several F.E.L. songs in addition to others.) The license was created
after widespread copyright violations were discovered under an earlier
two cents per-song/per-copy licensing arrangement.
The songs were available to parish churches in various other ways.
F.E.L. published printed hymnal songbooks, sheet music and congre-
gational cards, containing F.E.L.'s most popular songs. It offered an-
55. 628 F.2d 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
56. No. 81-1333 (7th Cir. 1982).
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other license to the parishes to make copies of the songs. That was a
"One Time Usage License" which allowed a song to be copied for use
at a single occasion at a cost of two cents per-copy/per-song. None of
these means were conducive to the creation of the desirable custom-
made hymnals.
F.E.L. became convinced that illegal copying continued and thus
filed suit for copyright infringement. Discovery disclosed over one and
one-half million unauthorized copies of the songs. However, the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, based on the defenses of
copyright misuse and violation of the Sherman Act, was granted.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the granting of the
motion was in error. The first defense of copyright misuse was founded
on the theory that F.E.L. had, by terms of the ACL, licensed the right
to perform the works at not-for-profit performances.
It is clear that the exclusive rights of a copyright owner include the
right to print, publish and copy a copyrighted work. Also protected is
the right to perform a work for profit.5 7 However, a copyright holder
cannot prevent a not-for-profit performance nor exact a fee for such a
performance.58
The appellate court examined the terms of various paragraphs of
the license, as had the trial court. It agreed that the license limited the
use of F.E.L. songs to not-for-profit performances, but disagreed on the
legal consequences of that fact. Specifically, a clause of the contract
granted to the licensee the right to perform the songs. Hence, the con-
tract may have required the licensee to pay for something the licensee
had the right to do, regardless of the license. The court examined the
license as a whole and concluded that it legitimately licensed the copy-
ing of the works and that the clause relating to performances served the
purpose of informing the licensee of its rights for exempt performances,
without exacting a fee.
The second issue on appeal was whether the license was illegal
under the Sherman Act. The district court had branded the ACL as a
"tying contract" and analogized the case to the facts of United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. 59 There, movie theaters were forced to accept
licenses for inferior films (tied product) in order to obtain licenses for
popular films (tying product). This form of conditional marketing was
57. 17 U.S.C. § 1.
58. 17 U.S.C. § l(e), Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc.,
141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944).
59. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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there held to be illegal per se under the Sherman Act. The Seventh
Circuit, however, found the ACL to be more appropriately analyzed as
a blanket license under the precedent established in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc. 60 The court noted that the
license scrutinized in Broadcast Music was so similar to the ACL as to
be indistinguishable. The ACL was held to be a singular commodity-
musical compositions-with no tied or tying product.
While the district court did not evaluate the ACL under the rule of
reason, the Seventh Circuit thought the issue ripe for review. Under
the rule of reason, an agreement is an unreasonable restraint if its anti-
competitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive effects. The court
found no anti-competitive effects, especially since there were realisti-
cally available methods of obtaining rights to the individual F.E.L.
songs.
Author Licensor Lacks Standing to Bring Antitrust Suit Against
Monopolist Licensee
Repp v. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd.
The case of Repp v. FEL. Publications, Ltd 61 shared facts with
EEL. v. Catholic Bishop. Repp had licensed his works to F.E.L. which
in turn licensed the parishes to use the works by means of the ACL.
Repp contended that the licensing practice detracted from a diminished
interest in and demand for his works which resulted in lesser royalties
being paid to him. He also contended that the licensing practice vio-
lated the antitrust laws.
The Seventh Circuit ruled, as had the court below, that Repp lack-
ed standing to bring suit under the antitrust laws. No copyright issues
were involved. For further discussion, the reader is invited to refer to
the antitrust section of this review.
Copyright Infringement of Video Game
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.
The Seventh Circuit treated the problem of protection of video
games by copyright law in the case of Atari, Inc. v. North American
Phips Consumer Electronics Corp. 62 The plaintiffs had brought an ac-
tion against the defendants for copyright infringement and unfair com-
60. 441 U.S. 1(1979).
61. 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982).
62. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1983).
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petition against their audiovisual game "PAC-MAN" by the
defendants' game "K. C. MUNCHKIN". The district court denied
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction since it found that the
plaintiffs had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits.
The appellate court went to considerable length describing the vis-
ual aspects of both games. After stating the standard of review for pre-
liminary injunctions, the court turned to the question of copyright
infringement. The determination of infringement was predicated upon
an ocular comparison of the works themselves and did not involve any
material credibility issues. Therefore, the appellate court was in as
good a position as the trial court to decide questions of infringement. 63
The parties had stipulated to the validity of the plaintiffs' copy-
right and to access to the work. The issue to be resolved was whether
there had been "copying" by the defendant. Copying could be inferred
where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and the ac-
cused work is substantially similar to the protected work.64
Some courts have expressed the test of substantial similarity in two
parts: (1) whether the defendant copied from the plaintiff's work and
(2) whether the copying, if proven, went so far as to constitute an im-
proper appropriation. 65 The court's analysis focused on the second
part of that test and the response of the "ordinary observer". Specifi-
cally, the test used was whether the accused work was so similar to the
plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude
that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectable
expression by taking material of substance and value.66 The court
noted that the ordinary observer test must also take into account that
the copyright law precludes appropriation of only those elements of the
work which are protected by the copyright. The protection extends
only to the expression of the idea and not the idea itself. But the court
stated:
There is no litmus paper test by which to apply the idea-expres-
sion distinction; the determination is necessarily subjective. As
Judge Learned Hand said, "Obviously, no principle can be stated as
63. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977);
cf. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976) (trademark infringement).
64. 672 F.2d at 614. See also Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d
204, 207 (2d Cit. 1981).
65. 672 F.2d at 614. See also Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1966), cerl.
denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
66. 672 F.2d at 614. See also Sid & Marty Kofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
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to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has bor-
rowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad
hoc.6
7
The Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs' audiovisual work is
primarily an unprotectable game, but to at least a limited extent the
particular form in which it is expressed (shapes, sizes, colors, se-
quences, arrangements, and sounds) provides something new or addi-
tional over the idea. The work was described as a maze game with
certain opponents which move independently. The audio component
and the concrete details of the visual presentation constitute the copy-
rightable expression of that game "idea."
Certain expressive matter in the PAC-MAN work, the maze and
scoring table were noted to be standard game devices and would be
protected only from virtually identical copying under the theory of
scenes afaire. Scenes afaire refers to incidents, characters or settings
which are as a practical matter indispensable. 68 K. C. Munchkin's
maze design, scoring table, and "dots" were found to be sufficiently
different to preclude a finding of infringement on that basis alone.
Rather, it was the substantial appropriation of the PAC-MAN
characters that was found to be an infringement and required a reversal
of the district court. The expression of the central figure as a "gobbler"
and the pursuit figures as "ghost monsters" distinguished PAC-MAN
from conceptually similar video games. The characters were found to
be wholly fanciful creations, without reference to the real world.
The defendants were found to not only have adopted the same
basic characters but also portrayed them in a manner which made K.
C. Munchkin appear substantially similar to PAC-MAN. Specific fea-
tures noted by the circuit court were the size and shape of the body, the
V-shaped "mouth", its gobbling action (with appropriate sounds), eye
and leg movement and the "regeneration" process. The court found
that the ordinary observer could conclude only that the defendants had
copied plaintiffs' work.
The district court's conclusion that the two works were not sub-
stantially similar was found to be clearly erroneous, and its refusal to
issue a preliminary injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. The
case was returned to the trial court with the admonition that the ordi-
nary observer test should not be applied in a judicial vacuum but that
67. 672 F.2d at 615, citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960).
68. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
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further development of facts at trial might command a conclusion dif-
ferent than that of the appellate court.
Ruling of Copyright Royalty Tribunal Approved
Amusement & Music Operators v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, Amusement &
Music Operators Association v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal
A Petition of Review of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal was the
subject of the combined cases of Amusement & Music Operators Associ-
ation v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, American Society of Composers,
Authors & Publishers v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal and Amusement &
Music Operators Association v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal.69 The Sev-
enth Circuit found the Tribunal's final rule establishing the increased
royalty fee payable by jukebox operators for public performances of
nondramatic musical works to be lawful in all respects.
Under the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. sections 101-
810, songs may be copyrighted but the exclusive right associated with
the copyright under section 106 of the Act is subject to the potential
unilateral exploitation device known as the "compulsory license."'70
Operators of jukeboxes must secure a compulsory license for the public
performance of phonorecords purchased for use in the jukeboxes. Sec-
tion 116 of the Act requires jukebox operators to enumerate the
number and location of their jukeboxes and deposit a royalty fee of
$8.00 for each phonorecord player with the Register of Copyrights.
The fees are then distributed to the copyright owners.
The Act also provided for the establishment of the Tribunal as the
administrative agency to make determinations concerning royalty rates.
Pursuant to a timetable set out in the Act 7 l, the Tribunal was directed
to commence proceedings in January, 1980, to determine whether an
adjustment of the jukebox royalty fee was warranted. It ruled that the
royalties payable should be set at a level of $50.00 per jukebox per
year, but the increase was to be implemented in two stages. A fee of
$25.00 would be charged in 1982 and 1983; thereafter, the operators
would be liable for the full $50.00.
69. 676 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1982).
70. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 116(b) (1981).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 804 (1981).
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The issues on appeal involved the law of review of rulemaking by
administrative bodies rather than any issues related to intellectual
property. The Seventh Circuit found that the Tribunal did not act
either unreasonably or unlawfully by establishing the $50.00 royalty
fee, which would be implemented in stages and be subject to future
inflationary adjustments. The petition for review was denied.

